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INTRODUCTION

To sixty-five percent of American families, the automobile is the most expensive single item, other than a house, they will ever purchase.' To fifteen
percent of American families, it is the most expensive item ever purchased.2
Since dependability is the main reason why many consumers pay a higher
price for a new car, 3 it is unfortunate that consumers have far more com1. See Automobile Warranty and Repair Act: Hearings on H.R. 1005 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt, bill sponsor).

2. See id. at 15-16.
3. See Warranty PerformanceObligations: Hearingson Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House
Comm. on Transportation, 68th Leg. (April 20, 1983). Texas consumers who testified before
the Committee as to their "lemon" experiences, were outraged at the extensive problems they
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plaints concerning new cars than any other product.4
According to consumer surveys, the reasons for such dissatisfaction inelude: the dealer's failure to cooperate in making warranty repairs or its
inability to successfully repair,5 and the necessity of having to return cars
repeatedly before obtaining a successful repair. 6 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports that of the thirty percent of consumers who have
warranty problems with their car, twenty-five percent are not only dissatisfied with the final result of their grievances, but are also dissatisfied with the
entire process of complaint-handling in the automobile industry. 7 In response to the frustrations of defective car owners,' Texas, along with many
other states, 9 has passed a "lemon law" 1 ° providing more definitive relief for
consumers." While the Texas Lemon Law parallels all other states' lemon
had with their cars in light of the fact that they specifically bought a new car to preclude such
problems. See id.
4. See Pertschuk, ConsumerAutomobile Problems, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 145, 145 (1978) (statistics based on complaints received by FTC).
5. See Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1032 (survey conducted by Consumer Reports reveals
dealer's failure to cooperate, and inability to successfully repair two most common consumer
complaints).
6. See id. at 1032. According to Whitford's survey, the necessity of returning cars repeatedly for warranty repair was the most common consumer problem reported. See id. at 1032.
The survey was conducted by the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory, and
consisted of 329 recent new-car purchasers. See id. at 1010 n. 10.
7. See Pertschuk, Consumer Automobile Problems, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 145, 146 (1978). Of
the thirty percent who have car warranty problems, thirty percent of those took over a month
to get the problems resolved. See id. at 146. The author, former Chairman of the FTC, estimates that "in a year in which ten million new units are sold ... nearly one million new-car
buyers have serious difficulty with warranty service." Id. at 146.
8. See Hearings on Tex. S.B. 1141 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development,
68th Leg. 1 (side 1) (1983) (copy on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). Senator Brown, bill
sponsor, describing the frustrations of lemon owners, points out a condition commonly observed: people displaying signs on their cars saying that the car is a lemon, describing where it
was purchased, and that the owner cannot get any recourse from the manufacturer. See id. at
1.
9. See id. at 5 (side 2) (Mr. Fondren, President of Texas Automobile Dealers Association
[hereinafter cited as TADA], strong proponent of S.B. 1141, pointed out existence of strong
movement of lemon laws "sweeping the country").
10. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985) ("Warranty
Performance Obligations," unofficially known as the "lemon law"); see also Hearingson Tex.
S.B. 1141 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 2 (side 1) (1983).
Mr. Fondren of TADA stated:
Senate Bill 1141 in terms of principle substance deals with the so-called lemon law provision, a word that we in the industry don't like to use, but which is understood and recognized by the public to describe some of the frustrations that they sometimes have with
vehicles that we sell to them.
Id. at 2.
11. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Briefly
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laws in that it provides car owners with substantially the same cause of action against manufacturers;12 it deviates, however, in the form of its warranty
dispute resolution system.
It is this uniqueness that provoked the recent constitutional attack of
Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission. Fortunately for Texas
lemon owners, the Texas Lemon Law has successfully withstood this attack.13 This comment will discuss the development of the lemon law in
Texas, and focus particularly upon the rationale for its recent constitutional
attack and subsequent reinstatement.

II.

PRE-LEMON LAW METHODS OF RECOVERY IN TEXAS

After repeated attempts to have his new car repaired, the frustrated

"lemon" owner, who has long since lost hope of his car ever being restored,

rightfully wants a return of his purchase price or a new car. 14 The manufacturer, however, having purposefully limited the buyer's remedy to repair or
to replacement of defective parts through a limited warranty, is not likely to
comply with either desire."5 Prior to the imposition of a lemon law, the

described, the statute provides the lemon owner with a course of action directly against the
automobile manufacturer, for replacement of the vehicle with one that is comparable or a
refund of the purchase price when the dealer is unable to make the vehicle conform to its
express warranty after a reasonable number of attempts at repair. See id. § 6.07(b). A reasonable number of attempts is presumed when the same defect has been subject to repair four or
more times, or the car is out of service for repair thirty or more days during the express
warranty term or within one year from date of original delivery, whichever is earlier. See id.
§ 6.07(d).
12. See id. § 6.07(e). The Texas statute is the only one of its kind that preconditions the
availability of the lemon presumption upon submission to the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission for a hearing on the merits. See id. § 6.07(e). The Connecticut statute for example is
representative of the other states' lemon laws, in that the utilization of the lemon law provisions are preconditioned upon submission to an informal dispute settlement mechanism complying with the FTC's regulations for such mechanisms at 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1984), if the
manufacturer has set up such a mechanism. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42.179(i) (West
1985).
13. Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985); Telephone interview with Clyde Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division (May 2, 1985). An update on the present status of Chrysler indicates that
Chrysler has filed a motion for extension in which to file their motion for rehearing. Id.
14. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to EnsureBroad Scope and Adequate Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 306 (1983). Most consumers who have had extensive
problems with defective cars want a refund rather than a replacement vehicle since they prefer
to sever the relationship with that particular manufacturer. See id. at 306 & n.53 (citing
BERNACCHI, AUTO WARRANTY SERVICE DISSATISFACTION II (Univ. of Detroit)).

15. See Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 A.2d 801, 804 (N.J. 1981) (in response to
lemon owner's demand for relief, dealer service manager advised owner he would have to live

"with this one"); see also Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer Product
Warranties,55 N.C.L. REv. 835, 844-45 (1977) (since automobile can only be resold at consid-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 6

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:155

Texas consumer, who had no other avenue of relief, was faced with one of
two choices: litigation, 16 or if he, like many consumers, could not afford the
costs of lengthy litigation, an absorption of the loss. 1 7 If the lemon owner
decided to file a lawsuit, his possible methods of recovery included: revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Section
2.608,18 recovery of damages for breach of warranty under UCC Section
2.714(2)," and in Texas, recovery of additional damages under the Texas

erably discounted price, "seller has a strong interest in precluding the buyer's revocation of
acceptance and binding him instead to accept repair"); Whitford, Law and the Consumer
Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1038 (1968)
(except for rare exceptions, automobile manufacturer will never offer new car).
16. See Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1039 (1968). Automobile manufacturers are not overly
concerned about adverse judgments because not many warranty disputes are litigated, "and it
is highly unlikely many would regardless of the attitude the manufacturers and dealers took
toward warranty obligation. The expense of legal action is simply too great.
...Id. at
1039.
17. See id. at 1039 n.84 (every lawyer author interviewed in Wisconsin would advise client against litigation of warranty dispute due to expenses involved); see also Eddy, Effects of
the Magnuson-Moss Act upon ConsumerProduct Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REV. 835, 869 (1977)
(consumers given "run-around" become frustrated, "drop-out," and bear their losses); Note,
Incentives for WarrantorFormationof Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235, 236 (1978) (it is to warrantor's advantage to delay' litigation thereby making it too
costly for consumers to pursue remedy).
18. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The text of
§ 2.608 reads:
(a) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(1)on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and it has
not been reasonably cured; or
(2) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced
either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(b) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(c) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
Id. § 2.608. U.C.C. revocation of acceptance has been the subject of many articles. See, e.g.,
Elden, Revocation of Acceptance: Interpretationand Application, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 14, 16 (1975);
Highsmith & Havens, Revocation of Acceptance and the Defective Automobile: The Uniform
Commercial Code to the Rescue, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 303, 306 (1980) (characterizes Code § 2.608
as having "been the object of considerable debate, study, argument, litigation, interpretation,
and perhaps, misapplication"); Note, Buyers Right to Revoke Acceptance Against the Manufacturerfor Breach of Its Continuing Warranty of Repair or Replacement, 7 GEO. L. REV. 711
(1973).
19. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The text of
§ 2.714 reads:
(a) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (c) of Section
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Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.2 °
The standard express warranty offered by automobile manufacturers2 1 exclusively limits the buyer's remedy upon breach of warranty22 to repair or

2.607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which
is reasonable.
(b) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place
of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had
if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount.
(c) In a proper case, any incidental and consequential damages under the next section
may also be recovered.
Id. § 2.714.
20. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The consumer is
entitled to a private cause of action upop breach of an express or implied warranty. The
pertinent portion reads: "(a) A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following
constitutes a producing cause of actual damages: (2) breach of an express or implied warranty." Id. § 17.50(a); see also Elias, The DTPA: The All-Encompassing Buyer Remedy in
Texas, 43 TEX. B.J. 745, 747 (1980) (for more in-depth treatment of Texas DTPA).
21. See Note, Buyer's Right to Revoke Acceptance Against the Manufacturerfor Breach of
Its Continuing Warranty of Repair or Replacement, 7 GEO. L. REV. 711, 712 & n.2 (1983)
(standard manufacturer's warranty originally developed by Automobile Manufacturer's Association has been adopted by all major-manufacturers and dealers). An example of the standard
manufacturer's new car limited warranty in pertinent part reads:
New Vehicle Limited Warranty
Ford Motor Company warrants that your selling Dealer will repair, replace, or adjust
parts, except tires in 1984 Ford Motor Company cars and light trucks, found to be defective in factory materials or workmanship made or supplied by Ford for the periods described below. Any Ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealer may perform the repairs if you have
moved, are traveling or need emergency service . . .The entire vehicle, except tires, is
covered for 12 months or 12,000 miles, whichever occurs earlier. . .(At bottom of pamphlet) Ford Motor Company does not authorize any person to create for it any other
obligation or liability in connection with these vehicles. TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED
BY LAW, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OR MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE APPLICABLE TO THESE VEHICLES IS LIMITED IN DURATION TO THE DURATION OF THESE WARRANTIES.
NEITHER FORD MOTOR COMPANY NOR THE SELLING DEALER SHALL BE
LIABLE FOR LOSS OF TIME, INCONVENIENCE, COMMERCIAL LOSS OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. (Bold print included in warranty).
Ford Motor Corp., Ford Warranty Information (1984).
22. See Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 517-18 (Wis. 1978). The
court clarified the often confused distinction between a limitation of warranties and a limitation of remedies: "A disclaimer of warranties limits the seller's liability by reducing the
number of circumstances in breach of the contract; it precludes the existence of a cause of
action. A limitation of remedies, on the other hand, restricts the remedies available to the
buyer once a breach is established." Id. at 517-18; see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11 at 471-72 (2d ed. 1980) (distinguishes between warranty
disclaimers and remedy limitations). As applied to the automobile manufacturer's standard
warranty, the warranty is that the vehicle will be free of defect in factory materials and work-
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replacement of defective parts 23 and effectively disclaims all other warranties 24 and remedies. 25 To successfully challenge the limited remedy of repair
or replacement in court, the buyer must first show that circumstances have
caused the remedy to "fail of its essential purpose" under UCC Section
2.7 19.26 Although Texas cases on this issue are few, Texas courts have tradi-

manship for the warranty period; breach of this warranty occurs when a defect appears during
this period; however, the buyer's remedy is exclusively limited to repair, replacement, or adjustment of that defective part. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code - A Limited Remedy
Fails of Its Essential Purpose Only in the Case of a Negligent or Willful Repudiation of the
Remedy, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 383, 386 (1972) (warranty is guarantee of quality while remedy is
sanction imposed for breach of warranty).
23. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This
section of the U.C.C. allows the manufacturer to limit the buyer's remedies upon breach of
warranty to repair or replacement:
(1) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in this chapter and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under
this chapter, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of
the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and (2) resort to
a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which it is the sole remedy.
Id. § 2.719(a).
24. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976). Since the manufacturer's limited repair warranty does not comply
with the federal minimum standards for "full" warranties at § 2304, it is a "limited" remedy;
therefore, the "duration" of any implied warranties may be limited to the duration of the
written warranty. See id. § 2308(b); see also Pertschuk, Consumer Automobile Problems, 11
U.C.C. L.J. 145, 149 n. 11 (1978) ("full" warranties that comply with § 2304 rare in automobile industry). See generally Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. L.J. 28 (1965) (thorough discussion of warranty disclaimers under
U.C.C.); Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty under the U.C.C. - How to Succeed
in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 DENVER L.J. 579 (1969) (analysis
of effective warranty disclaimers in light of judicial interpretation).
25. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (manufacturer permitted to exclude consequential damages unless exclusion "unconscionable"). See
generally Weintraub, Disclaimerof Warrantiesand Limitations of Damagesfor Breach of Warranty under the U. CC., 53 TEXAS L. REV. 60, 63-74 (1974) (in-depth analysis of contractual
limitations on liability).
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) ("(b) where
circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may
be had as provided in this title"). The official comment to § 2.719 explains that "it is of the
very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available," and
where a clause might be fair and reasonable, circumstances can operate so as to deprive a party
of the "substantial value of the bargain"; therefore, the party is eligible for any remedy as
provided in the Title. See id. § 2.719 comment 1. Courts often rely on the comment to find a
failure of essential purpose. See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971).
The court, finding a failure of essential purpose by relying on comment I to § 2.719, reasoned
that enforcement of a limited remedy under circumstances where repeated efforts failed to
correct the defect would deprive the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain. See id. at
673; see also Jacobs v. Rosemont Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 1981)
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tionally taken an unusually strict stance in their interpretations of Section
2.7 19.27 For example, in Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales z8 although the
owner's new Thunderbird developed a total of fifty defects and was out of
service for repair a total of forty-five days during the first eighteen months of
ownership, the court found that as long as the dealer kept making good-faith
efforts to repair, the limited remedy did not fail of its essential purpose. 29 In
a subsequent case, a car owner, after three unsuccessful attempts by the
dealer to repair the same defect, abandoned her car at the dealership.3 ° The
court, relying primarily on Lankford, reasoned that since there was no evidence that the car had been unsuccessfully repaired the fourth time, there
was no failure of the limited remedy's essential purpose.3 1

(not only will warrantor's willful refusal to repair cause exclusive remedy to fail of its essential
purposes, but failure to repair within reasonable time will also cause failure of essential purpose); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (S.D. 1975) (theory of "deprivation of the substantial value of the bargain" utilized in finding a failure of essential purpose).
27. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Vernon 1968); see also Note, Failure
of the Essential Purpose of a Limited Repair Remedy under Section 2. 719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 292, 293 (1980) (for further examination of harsh burden
placed upon Texas consumer seeking to abrogate limited repair remedy).
28. 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (first time Texas
court faced with question whether limited remedy of repair or replacement had failed of its
essential purpose as contemplated by Code § 2.719(b)); see also Note, Uniform Commercial
Code - A Limited Remedy Fails of Its Essential Purpose Only in the Case of a Negligent or
Willful Repudiation of the Remedy - Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 383,
386 (1972-73) (upon thorough analysis of Lankford, author concludes court's decision was
result of misinterpretation of § 2.719(b)).
29. See Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court affirmed summary judgment for defendants rejecting claim for
damages, reasoning that there could be no failure of limited remedy's essential purpose without
willful or negligent repudiation of its terms). But see, e.g., Jacobs v. Rosemont Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 1981) (if seller refuses to repair or replace within
reasonable time, buyer deprived of exclusive remedy and mere commendable efforts do not
relieve seller of obligations to repair); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349,
355-57 (Minn. 1977) (seller does not have unlimited time to deliver conforming goods; a remedy fails of its essential purpose when it becomes obvious automobile cannot or will not be
restored to reasonably good operating condition); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492
S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn. 1972) (no requirement that failure to repair be willful or negligent in
order to find failure of essential purpose of limited repair remedy).
30. See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ) (after returning defective vehicle to dealership for fourth time, Mrs. Henderson
refused tender of car).
31. See id. at 669. The defendant proved that the car was finally repaired after Mrs.
Henderson refused to pick the car up. See id. at 667. The court disregarded the number of
attempts it took defendant to repair and instead found that since the defects were repaired, the
terms of the warranty were complied with. See id. at 669. But see, e.g., Adams v. J. I. Case
Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 6 (11. 1970) (when defendant took inordinate amount of time to correct
repairable defect, court found failure of purpose reasoning that when defendant "agreed to
repair or replace the defective parts of the tractor there arose an implied warranty that the
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Unfortunately, neither court followed the sound reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in Riley v. Ford Motor Co.,32 which is a fair representation of the
approach followed by many other jurisdictions faced with interpretation of
Section 2.719." In Riley, the court reasoned that a newly purchased automobile should eventually be put in good running condition and the seller
does not have an unlimited time to do so." In finding a failure of essential
purpose, the court stated that "at some point in time, it must be obvious to
all people that a particular vehicle simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free from defect." 35 Since Texas courts
have not adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the burden of showing a failure of essential purpose continues to be a substantial barrier to successful
recovery in Texas. 36
Once the buyer, however, is successful in establishing that his limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, he then has available to him the whole
range of UCC remedies which include revocation of acceptance and dam-

manufacturers, and dealer would correct the defects within a reasonable time."); Durfee v.
Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 355-57 (Minn. 1977) (unsuccessful repair after
reasonable amount of time is failure of essential purpose); Goddard v. General Motors Corp.,
396 N.E.2d 761, 764-65 (Ohio 1979) (even where defect repairable, court found failure of
limited remedy's essential purpose when defect not cured within reasonable time). For an indepth analysis of both Lankford and Henderson, see Note, Failureof the EssentialPurpose of a
Limited Repair Remedy under Section 2.719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 BAYLOR L.
REV. 292, 294-98 (1980).
32. 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971) (after new car developed total of fourteen defects,
purchaser brought suit for breach of warranty and negligent repair).
33. See Stofman v. Keenan Motors, Inc., 14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 1252, 1254
(Pa. 1974). Finding a failure of essential purpose, the court reasoned: "The question we must
consider is just how long the buyer must wait and how many unfulfilled promises may be made
before he is entitled to revoke his acceptance of an automobile and be returned the purchase
price. Our sympathies lie with those who repeatedly return their cars for repairs of service,
then get them back in almost the same condition as when the complaints were originally registered". See id. at 1254; see also Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp 423, 426 (Del.
1973) (from buyer's point of view purpose of exclusive remedy is to provide goods that conform to contract within reasonable time after defective part discovered; limited exclusive remedy fails of its purpose and is avoided under § 2.719(b), whenever warrantor fails to correct
defect within reasonable time); Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies,
Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. 1972) (automobile purchaser not bound to permit seller to tinker
with car indefinitely in hopes of ultimate compliance with warranty).
34. See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Earnest, 184 So.2d 811, 814 (Ala. 1966)).
35. See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971) (thereafter finding
failure of purpose since repeated but unsuccessful attempts at repair operate to deprive buyer
of substantial value of bargain).
36. See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ) (both Texas cses find no failure of limited remedy's essential purpose regardless
of dealer's inability to successfully repair within reasonable time); Lankford v. Rogers Ford
Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ages for breach of warranty.3 7 If he chooses to revoke acceptance and, thus,
obtain a return of his purchase price, the buyer must prove that the nonconformity, "substantially impairs" the value of the automobile to him.3" In
addition, he must show that he has revoked within a "reasonable time" upon
discovery of the defect.39 Having successfully accomplished these two tasks,
recovery may still be denied. For example, depending on the jurisdiction,
continued use of the vehicle by the owner after attempted revocation may
invalidate his claim." Also, in some states, including Texas, revocation
37. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see also
Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 250, 253 (Ga. 1972). Upon a finding of
failure of purpose the court explained that the statement in the warranty limiting the buyer's
remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts referred to remedies available "upon discovery of a defect, not remedies available to the purchaser after the seller has breached its warranty ....
See Jacobs v. Metro-Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 188 S.E.2d at 253.
38. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (buyer may
revoke acceptance of product where nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him).
Courts have had trouble determining what constitutes "substantial" because of the uncertainty
of whether to use a subjective approach or an objective one. Compare Sauers v. Tibbs, 363
N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ill. 1977) (effect of impairment on user critical and not dollar value of repairs) with Freeman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1979, writ ref., n.r.e.) ($75 to $100 defect in $5,720.33 automobile not such nonconformity so as to substantially impair value of car). For additional inconsistent decisions on the
issue of what constitutes substantial impairment, see Koperski v. Husker Dodge, 302 N.W.2d
655, 658-660, 662 (Neb. 1981) (car vibrated at speeds of 35-40 mph., engine died when air
conditioning turned on and when put in reverse, stopping and jerking when gears failed to
shift, "rubbing metallic sound," radiator work done, and transmission replaced with unsuccessful results, and court did not find proof of substantial impairment); Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 185, 205 (N. J. 1968) (revocation allowed even when curable defect
shakes buyer's confidence in automobile); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513,
521 (Wis. 1978) (cumulative effect of many minor defects will cause substantial impairment).
See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.608 at
13 (1971) (test of substantial impairment not determined by dollar percentage but by effect of
defect on intended user); Adams, Revocation of Acceptance: The Test for Substantial Impairment, 32 U. PITr. L. REV. 439 (1971) (survey of case law interpretation of substantial
impairment).
39. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The
buyer must revoke his acceptance within a reasonable time of discovering the defect. See id.
§ 2.608(b). Generally, the reasonableness of time requirement is interpreted leniently since it
is the seller's attempts to repair the defects which causes the delay. See, e.g., Tiger Motor v.
McMurtry, 224 So. 2d 638, 647 (Ala. 1969) (after repeated attempts at adjustment had failed,
court found buyer revoked within reasonable time); Frontier Mobile Home Sales v. Trigleth,
505 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Ark. 1974) (buyer should not be penalized for continued patience with
seller who promises to repair nonconforming defect); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, 374
A.2d 144, 149 (Conn. 1976) (because of continuous series of negotiations and repairs, delay in
notice to revoke acceptance not found to prejudice dealer and therefore not unreasonable).
40. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Subsection (3) provides that one who revokes acceptance "has the same rights and duties with regard
to the goods as if he had rejected them." See id. § 2.608(c). He is, therefore, bound by
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against the manufacturer is precluded for lack of contractual privity.4"
If the buyer cannot successfully revoke his acceptance, he may still be able
to recover damages for breach of warranty under Section 2.714.42 The usual
measure of damages for breach of warranty is "the difference at the time and
and the value
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
43
they would have had if they had been as warranted.,

§ 2.602(2) which provides that "after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with
respect to any commerical unit is wrongful as against the seller." See id. § 2.602(b)(1); see
also Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Division, 307 A.2d 815, 816 (Del. 1973) (revoking buyer has
same duties as rejecting buyer, including duty under § 2.602(2)(a) not to exercise ownership
over goods; thus, continued use invalidated revocation); Charney v. Ocean Pontiac, Inc., 17
U.C.C. REP. 982, 982 (Mass. 1975) (continued use of automobile defeats buyer's right to revoke); Fecik v. Capindale, 10 U.C.C. REP. 1391, 1392 (Pa. 1971) (continued use of and payment toward automobile for more than one year after buyer unsuccessfully attempted to
revoke from seller invalidates buyer's cause of action for revocation of acceptance). But see
Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., 492 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1972) (recognized buyer's need to
use car thus allowed post-revocation use). Those courts that do allow post-revocation use,
usually allow the seller a reasonable offset for the buyer's use. See Orange Motors of Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 1972); Johannsen v.
Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1981). See generally Note,
Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revocation ofAcceptance under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1373-80 (1978) (for further treatment of post-revocation use
of defective goods).
41. See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ) (in disallowing buyer to revoke acceptance against manufacturer, court reasoned that since case was not strict liability but economic loss, privity of contract required);
Emmons v. Durable Mobile Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
no writ) (buyer cannot rescind contract in suit against manufacturer since no privity of contract). But see Ventura v. Ford Motor Co., 433 A.2d 801, 811 (N.J. 1981). While it was
acknowledged that revocation of acceptance is a right "available to a buyer against a seller in
privity," the court held that when "the manufacturer gives a warranty to induce the sale, it is
consistent to allow the same type of remedy as against that manufacturer." See id. at 811; see
also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (N.J. 1960) (obligations of manufacturers should not be based solely on privity of contract).
42. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (upon
finding of failure of limited remedy's essential purpose, buyer entitled to remedy provided in
title). The buyer who is no longer limited to the remedy of repair or replacement may subsequently recover damages for breach of warranty under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). At least one court, however, has disallowed a breach of warranty
suit against the dealer for lack of privity. See Bill McDavid Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Mulcahy, 533
S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (buyer not entitled to sue
dealer for breach of warranty because mere delivery of manufacturer's warranty to purchaser
by dealer does not make dealer party to instrument).
43. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.714(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). While
other measures of damages are accepted by courts, there seems to be some inconsistency in
Texas as to what amount of evidence is necessary to prove such damages. Compare Jordan
Ford, Inc. v. Alsbury, 625 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (while cost of
reasonable repairs acceptable measure of actual damages for breach of warranty, testimony of
price paid to repair vehicle insufficient to prove amount reasonable) with Tom Benson Chevro-
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In Texas, once the buyer successfully revokes his acceptance, 44 or establishes a breach of warranty, 45 he may recover additional damages under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).4 6
While the potential recovery under the DTPA could be very rewarding, decisions handed down by Texas courts have been very unpredictable, thereby

making recovery for Texas consumers uncertain.4 7

The high costs of extensive litigation coupled with the well-founded fear of
nonrecovery, make it evident why many discouraged lemon owners with
meritorious cases have abandoned their causes and absorbed their losses.
III.

THE TEXAS LEMON LAW: A DEFINITIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
DIRECTLY AGAINST THE MANUFACTURER

The Texas Legislature realized the lemon owners' need for relief" in the

let, Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(owner's testimony that, in her opinion, present value of vehicle $500, sufficient to sustain
finding of $4,100 in diminished market value).
44. See Freeman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d 112, 133 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref. n.r.e.). In order for buyer to have his purchase price refunded
under DTPA, he must first prove that he has revoked acceptance by proving that the nonconformity substantially impaired the value of the automobile to him. See id. at 133.
45. See Jordan Ford, Inc. v. Alsbury, 625 S.W.2d 1, 1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ) (basis of action brought under DTPA was breach of warranty); see also Tom Benson
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.) (diminished market value measure of damages for breach of warranty which was basis
of action brought under DTPA).
46. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1984). In addition to the
actual damages, a consumer who files suit under the DTPA may also recover twice the amount
of actual damages awarded not in excess of one thousand dollars. See id. § 17.50(a)(2) &
(b)(1). If the court finds the breach to have been committed knowingly, treble damages may be
awarded of those damages in excess of one thousand dollars. See id. § 17.50(b)(1). The consumer may also recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. See id. § 17.50(d). Texas
courts have been inconsistent in their decisions of whether to allow incidental and consequential damages which have been contractually disclaimed. Compare Orr Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Courtney, 488 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, no writ) (recovery did
not include damages for loss of vehicle as result of breach of express warranty when such
damages had been disclaimed) with Sari Montgomery Oldsmobile Co. v. Johnson, 624 S.W.2d
237, 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, no writ) (owner entitled to recover loss of
rentals resulting when agreements to lease vehicle with third parties could not be performed
because of vehicle malfuncations even though such commercial losses were disclaimed).
47. See Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House Comm. on Transportation,68th
Leg. (April 19, 1983). Clyde Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division, describes the uncertainty of recovery in Texas when there is a disclaimer of
warranties and a limitation of remedies as a "very critical gap in Texas law." See id.
48. See Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House Comm. on Transportation, 68th
Leg. (April 20, 1983). The Committee heard testimony of several Texas consumers. See id.
One consumer purchased a diesel Oldsmobile which, by the time the car had logged 54,000
miles, the transmission had been rebuilt three times and had been returned to the repair shop
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form of a clearly defined cause of action directly against the manufacturer,
and through a low cost, readily accessible dispute resolution system.4 9 The
"Warranty Performance Obligations" provision of S.B. 1141 - H.B. 2211
provides such relief.5" The Texas Lemon Law, as it is unofficially known, is
patterned in substance after Connecticut's law which was the first of its kind
to be enacted."1

fifty-nine times but had yet to be repaired. See id. The frustrated consumer testified that after
she had been "all around the mulberry bush," she still had received no cooperation or relief
from General Motors and has had to file suit. See id. Another consumer testified to a wide
range of defects occurring in her "lemon" including the flow of transmission fluid through the
speedometer. See id. Finally, one consumer expressed the frustration felt by many lemon
owners: "I want to tell you why I'm so concerned about it. My feeling is that very soon now,
that car is going to be where it just won't run at all and I still owe three and half years on
it .... I See id.
Clyde Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division
stressed the importance and need for such a law since recovery under the doctrine of revocation of acceptance is so uncertain in Texas when there has been such disclaimers or limitations
of remedies and warranties. See id.
49. See Jones, Wanted: A New System for Solving Consumer Grievances, 25 ARB. L.J.
234, 234-35 (1970). For most consumers, "the formalities and cost of litigation make recourse
to the law either unpalatable or unfeasible;" therefore, the author stresses that "[o]ne of the
most important aspects of consumer protection today concerns the availability of effective machinery for the resolution of consumer grievances in the marketplace. See id. at 234-35; see
also Jones and Boyer, Improving the Quality ofJustice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better
Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357, 362 (1972). "The existence of a workable
grievance-solving mechanism would also alleviate another, more subtle external cost that is
imposed upon society: the lingering, rankling sense of frustration experienced by the consumers who feel they have been cheated but realize that justice is priced beyond their means." Id.
at 362.
50. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ann. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985); see also
Hearingson Tex. SB. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 9
(1983). Gene Fondren of TADA explains the bill as providing a "new cause of action" for the
lemon owner directly against the manufacturer or distributor. See id. at 9. The statute also
preconditions the use of the lemon presumption upon submission before the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission for a hearing on the merits of the consumer's case. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). As brought out by Rep. Schleuter
before the Committee, this provision of the bill provides the consumer with an effective and
inexpensive dispute resolution system. See Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House
Comm. on Transportation,68th Leg. (April 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Schleuter, bill sponsor).
Besides providing the consumer with a definitive cause of action and an inexpensive dispute
resolution system, the most important consumer relief will be in the form of better warranty
repair service. See Hearingson Tex. S.B. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 12 (April 20, 1983) (statement of Mr. Fondren of TADA). The bill will
provide the manufacturers with the incentive to make sure their dealers have efficient warranty
repair service. See id.at 12.
51. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 (West 1985) (enacted June 4, 1982, effective October
6, 1983); see also Honignan, The New Lemon Laws. Expanding UC.C. Remedies, 17 U.C.C.
L.J. 116, 118 (1984) (most states have patterned their lemon laws after Connecticut's, with
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In summary, the Texas statute first provides that if a new" motor vehicle5 3 does not conform to the manufacturer's express warranties, 54 and the
owner 55 reports such nonconformity to the manufacturer or its dealer 56 during the warranty period or within one year from original delivery of the
vehicle, whichever is earlier, the manufacturer or dealer must make
whatever repairs are necessary to conform the vehicle to the warranty.5 7 If
the manufacturer is unable to cure the defect after a reasonable number 58
of
attempts at repair, and if the nonconforming defect substantially impairs

variations from state to state); Note, The Connecticut Lemon Law, 5 BRIDGE. L. REV. 175,
178-82 (1983) (comprehensive analysis of Connecticut's "Lemon Law"); Note, Sweetening the
Fate of the "Lemon" Owner: California and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 341, 345-51 (1983) (comparative examination between
Connecticut's "lemon law" and California's "lemon law" which was second to be enacted);
Note, Lemon Laws: Putting the Squeeze on Automobile Manufacturers, 61 WASH. U. L. Q.
1125, 1126-34 (1983) (survey of eighteen lemon laws that had been enacted thus far including
Texas' law).
52. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 1.03(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985). A
"new" motor vehicle is defined as one which has not been the subject of a "retail sale"; therefore, "demonstrator" models would also be subject to the lemon law. See id.
53. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 1.03(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(Motor Vehicle Code now defines "motor vehicle" to include engine, transmission, and rear
axles of heavy duty trucks, and "two or more wheeled" off-road vehicles) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(B) (West 1984) (specifically excludes "motorcycles, motor homes, or offroad vehicles" from lemon law coverage and further limits "new motor vehicles" to one
bought primarily for "personal, family, or household purposes").
54. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.2(a) (West 1985) (one of many lemon laws which
only apply to manufacturer's express warranties) with N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:2,
§ 357-D:3 (Supp. 1984) (includes both express and implied warranties under lemon law
coverage).
55. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985). For
purposes of the lemon law provision an "owner" means:
[T]he person so designated on the certificate of title to a motor vehicle issued by the State
Department of Highways and Public Transportation, or an equivalent document issued
by the duly authorized agency of any other state, or any person to whom such motor
vehicle is legally transferred during the duration of the manufacturer's or distributor's
express warranty applicable to such motor vehicle, and any other person entitled by the
terms of such warranty to enforce the obligations thereof.
Id.
56. See id. § 6.07(b) (actual language is "to the manufacturer or distributor, its agent, or
its authorized dealer").
57. See id. § 6.07(b) (statute expressly states provision does not limit remedies otherwise
available to new car owner under warranty that extends longer than one year).
58. See id. § 6.07(c); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(A) (West 1985); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 7N1/2 (West 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2703 (Supp. 1984) (all
require substantial impairment and like Texas statute, do not define what interpretation is to
be given term). One can only speculate that "substantial impairment" should be given an
objective interpretation when one compares it to the subjective language of the Connecticut
Lemon Law provision. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42.179(d) (West 1985) ("a defect or
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the use and market value59 of the vehicle, the manufacturer 6 0 shall replace
the vehicle with one comparable,61 or refund to the owner the purchase
price, 62 less a reasonable allowance for the owner's use of the vehicle. 63 The

condition which substantially impairs the use, safety or value of the motor vehicle to the consumer") (emphasis added).
59. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325 F. 665(3)(a) (Supp. 1985) (substantial impairment of
"use and market value") with CAL. CiV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(A) (West 1984) (substantial
impairment of "use, value, or safety"); see also Honigman, The New "Lemon Laws"- Expanding U.CC. Remedies, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 116, 121 (1984). Approximately half of the states
follow Connecticut's language of "use and value" and the other half follow California's "use,
value, or safety." See id. at 121. Honigman observes that the "use, value, or safety" language
might provide more coverage. See id. For further variations, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4503(1) (1983) ("use and market value or safety"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2703 (Supp. 1983)
("use or market value"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-101(c) (Supp. 1984) ("use and fair market
value").
60. See Debate on Tex. H.B. 2211 on the Floor of the House, 68th Leg. (May 17, 1983). In
opposition to the Hackney amendment which would have made dealers as well as manufacturers liable to lemon owners, Rep. Schleuter and Rep. Salinas illustrate their point:
Rep. Salinas: "How many dealers in Texas make cars?"
Rep. Schleuter: "None that I know."
Rep. Salinas: "Why should they have to give you a new car when they don't have
anything to do with the making of it?"
Rep. Schleuter: "I don't think they should."

Id.
61. See id. Rep. Clemments' amendment which would have required replacement with a
new comparable vehicle was rejected. See id. Rep. Schleuter, arguing against the proposed
amendment, stated that the whole idea behind the bill is to allow the Motor Vehicle Commission to look into each case and decide "what is fair." See id. Rep. Delay, concurring, stated
that the amendment could "completely remove any flexibility in arbitration over the facts of
the case .. " See id. Therefore, the lemon owner could receive a replacement vehicle that

already has logged mileage, to compensate for the use he has made of his vehicle. See id. But
see Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate Remedies, 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 306 (1983) ("uncertainty as to what constitutes a comparable
replacement will lead to unnecessary litigation"). For variations in other states, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(d) (West 1985) (provides option of replacement with "new motor
vehicle acceptable to the consumer"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.102(2) (West 1985) (defines
comparable motor vehicle as one of the same model, year, and equivalent condition at time of
replacement).
62. See Debateon Tex. S.B 1411 on the Floor of the Senate, 68th Leg. 3 (April 18, 1983).
The original language of S.B. 1411 specifically excluded "sales tax, registration fees or other
official fees from the amount the buyer could be refunded." See id. at 3. However, an amendment proposed by Senator Glascow struck that language from the bill so that the buyer could
be afforded the opportunity to recover that amount. See id.But see Debate on Tex. H.B. 2211
on the Floor of the House, 68th Leg. (May 17, 1983). Rep. Luna proposed an amendment to
insert the following language after "purchase price:" "including, but not limited to sales tax
dealer preparation charges, insurance premiums on a policy that would be cancelled, and the
full amount of interest paid." See id. Rep. Schleuter, in opposing the rejected amendment,
stated that it should be within the discretion of the arbitration committee whether or not to
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statute then creates the presumption' 4 that a "reasonable number of attempts to repair" have been made when: (1) the same defect is subject to
unsuccessful repair for four or more times;" or (2) the vehicle has been out
of service for repair for a total of thirty or more days during the express
warranty term or within one year from delivery date, whichever is earlier.66

refund this amount. See id. Other states do provide for reimbursement of such collateral
charges. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179 (West 1985) (may recover contract price
and all collateral charges); MINN. STAT. § 325 F. 665(3)(a) (Supp. 1985) (in addition to full
purchase price, consumer entitled to recover cost of options or modifications, and all other
charges including, but not limited to, sales tax, license fees, and registration fees); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-2703 (Supp. 1983) (may recover purchase price including all sales taxes, license
fees, registration fees and any similar governmental charges). Some states also provide for
recovery of attorneys fees and court costs. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 (West
1985) (in any action against manufacturer or dealer based on express or implied warranty,
court may award plaintiff "his costs and reasonable attorney's fees."); MINN. STAT. § 325 F.
665(6) (Supp. 1985) (may recover court costs and disbursements, including attorney's fees);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2707 (Supp. 1983) (attorney's fees may be awarded to the consumer
who prevails in an action under lemon law). In Texas, it is up to the Commission whether the
manufacturer will have to replace the car or refund the purchase price. See Hearings on Tex.
SB. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 6-8 (April 11, 1983)
(Mr. Fondren of TADA explaining provisions of S.B. 1411). In other states, the manufacturer
may provide a refund or replacement at his own option. See Honigman, The New "Lemon
Laws" Expanding U.C.C. Remedies, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 116, 118-19 (1984) ("lemon laws" allow
consumers recovery of purchase price and collateral charges or replacement vehicle at manufacturer's option). But see MINN. STAT. § 325 F.665(3)(a) (Supp. 1984) (consumer can elect
either replacement vehicle or refund of purchase price).
63. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (reasonable allowance for use is amount directly attributable to use of motor vehicle prior to first
report of nonconformity and during any subsequent period when vehicle not out of service for
repair). But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West 1985) (amount deducted for buyer's use
limited to only that period prior to discovery of nonconformity); see also MINN. STAT. § 325
F.665(3)(a) (Supp. 1984) (reasonable allowance for consumer's use of vehicle must not exceed
ten cents per mile or ten percent of purchase price of vehicle, whichever less).
64. See Note, L.B. 155: Nebraska's "Lemon Law" Synthesizing Remedies for the Owner
of a "Lemon" 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 345, 372-73 (1984). When the consumer is unable to
raise the presumption, if for example his car has been repaired many times for different defects
or has been out of service only twenty-nine days, he can still sue under the lemon law by
sustaining the burden of proving a reasonable number of attempts have been made to repair.
See id. at 372-73.
65. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(3)(a) (West 1985) (presumption of reasonable
number of attempts raised after three repair attempts or fifteen business days during warranty
period or one year, whichever earlier); MINN. STAT. § 325 F.665(3)(c) (Supp. 1984). The
presumption of a reasonable number of attempts to repair arises only after one attempt if the
nonconformity results in a "complete failure" of the braking or steering system and is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury if the vehicle is driven. See id. § 325 F.665(3)(c). The
vehicle returned under the lemon law with such braking or steering defect may not be resold in
Minnesota. See id. § 325 F.665(4)(b).
66. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 6.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (thirty
day period, warranty term, and one year period will be extended if repair service not available
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The presumption shall apply only if the consumer has directly notified the
manufacturer of the defect in writing and has given the manufacturer an
opportunity to cure the defect. 67 The manufacturer is provided with an affirmative defense if "(1) the nonconformity is the result of abuse, neglect, or
unauthorized modifications or alterations of the motor vehicle; or (2) the
nonconformity does not substantially impair the use or value of the motor
vehicle." 68 The statute then specifically states that the provision is not available in a suit against the seller, but only against the manufacturer or distributor, and further provides that the consumer's rights or remedies under any
other law are not limited by the provision. 69 A proceeding under the Lemon
Law, however, may be brought only within six months following (1) the
expiration of the express warranty period; or (2) one year after the date of
"original delivery" of the vehicle to the owner.7 °

by reason of "war, invasion, strike or fire, flood or other natural disaster"). But see N. Y.
GEN. Bus. LAWS § 198-a(d) (McKinney Supp. 1984) (time period within which four attempts
to repair or thirty days must occur extended to two years or 18,000 miles, whichever earlier);
see also Honigman, The New "Lemon Laws": Expanding UC.C. Remedies, 17 U.C.C. L.J.
116, 118 (1984) (more than half of lemon law states use thirty business days rather than calendar days as out-of-service period).
67. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (statute does not specify when notice must be given; just that it must be given before presumption
can be used). But see Hearingson Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House Comm. on Transportation,
68th Leg. (May 11, 1983). There was opposition to the requirement of written notice from Jim
Boyle, Legislative Director of Texas Consumers Association, and Clyde Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division. See id. While it was agreed that
written notice was a good idea to enable the consumer to prove that notice was given, making
the requirement mandatory would operate as a "unnecessary obstacle" to consumer recovery.
See id.; see also Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 302, 308 (1983). The provision requiring notice to the
manufacturer could operate to unnecessarily deprive a consumer of a cause of action under the
lemon law. See id. at 308. The dealer who is in daily contact with the manufacturer should be
required to give the necessary notice. See id. at 308.
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
69. See id. § 6.07(0.
70. See id. § 6.07(h) (Vernon Supp. 1985). But see Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written
to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 308 (1983).
The same eighteen month limitation on a lemon law proceeding was proposed by manufacturers in Massachusetts. See id. at 308. Rigg described this provision as an "ill-disguished attempt to frustrate the purposes of the act by cutting off buyer rights." See id. at 308. For
example, a consumer who discovers a defect just under one year from delivery and gives the
manufacturer four attempts to correct the defect, will probably exceed his eighteen month
deadline. See id. at 308. The general statute of limitations, which would apply without the
eighteen month limitation, adequately protects against old claims. See id. at 308; see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(2) (West 1985) (specifically provides for tolling of statute of limitations
during third party resolution process). But see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36),
§ 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (Texas makes no provision for tolling of statute of limitations on
subsequent de novo cause of action).
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IV. THE TEXAS LEMON LAW PROVIDES A DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEM WHICH DIFFERS FROM THOSE PROVIDED BY ALL
OTHER STATES' LEMON LAWS

Besides providing a clearly defined cause of action against the manufacturer, the lemon laws provide the consumer with another important benefit:
a low-cost, readily available mechanism for resolving their disputes.7 Almost all states' lemon laws provide that if a manufacturer sets up a dispute
settlement mechanism that conforms to the federal regulations for such
mechanisms, the consumer must resort to those arbitration boards before
qualifying for the provisions of the lemon law in a court action.7 2 The federal requirements for Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (IDSM),
73
promulgated by the FTC pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
are designed to ensure that the mechanism's members and staff are not influenced by the warrantor/sponsor.7 4 Under the regulations, although the
mechanism's decision is not binding on either party, it is admissible in evidence in any subsequent action brought by the purchaser arising out of the
same warranty claim.75
The Texas lemon law is the only one of its kind to condition the availability of its provisions upon a hearing before a state agency instead of a manu71. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). See
generally Hearings on Tex. S.B. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development,
68th Leg. 5 (side 2) (April 20, 1983) (Mr. Fondren explains that it is standard for lemon laws
to provide for grievance solving mechanisms).
72. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(e)(3) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
121-1/2 § 1204(a) (1983); MINN. STAT. 325 F.665(5) (Supp. 1985) (requires only that IDSM
"substantially comply" with FTC's regulations). But see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-103(l)(d)
(Supp. 1985). Besides Texas, North Carolina is the only state not to provide for use of an
IDSM sponsored by the manufacturer. See id. § 25-2-103(l)(d) North Carolina's lemon law,
however, is not a "true" lemon law in that it merely changes the U.C.C. definition of a "seller"
to include manufacturer of a motor vehicle who makes an express warranty, thereby eliminating privity problems for the buyer. See id. § 25-2-103(l)(d).
73. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301 (1976).
74. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.3-.5 (1984). Some of the federal regulations for these dispute
settlement mechanisms include: (1) the mechanism be funded and staffed by the warrantor
and provided to the consumer free of charge, (2) no arbitration panel member may be an
employee or agent of a party other than for the purposes of arbitration, (3) two-thirds of the
members cannot have any "direct involvement in the manufacture, distribution, sale or service
of any product," (4) the decision is not binding on any party, but the manufacturer must make
a "good faith" effort to comply with the decision, (5) the mechanism has the duty to collect the
information relevant to the dispute, (6) the parties are entitled to make oral arguments, under
certain conditions including agreement by both parties, and (7) a decision must be made within
forty days of the complaint. See id. 703.3-.5 See generally Schroeder, Private Actions under the
Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct, 66A CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1973) (brief summary of operation
of IDSMs as set up pursuant to FTC's regulations).
75. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j) (1984).
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facturer-sponsored dispute settlement mechanism.76 Section 6.07 extends
the authority already possessed by the existing Texas Motor Vehicle Commission to handle automobile warranty complaints 77 by also giving the Commission the power to order a replacement vehicle or a refund of the
purchaser's price. 7' The Commission, which consists of nine members, five

of whom are dealers,7 9 is empowered to "hold hearings, administer oaths,
receive evidence, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of papers and documents related to the hearing" in order
to make a decision in the manufacturer-consumer warranty dispute."0 If the
consumer is dissatisfied by the Commission's decision, the Lemon Law provides him with the right of a trial de novo in which the Commission's decision is not admissible in evidence against him. s l There is no similar
76. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6 0 7 (e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). See
Hearings on Tex. S.B. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 14
(April 20, 1983). Mr. Fondren explains that the mechanism providing for a hearing as a condition to bringing suit under the lemon law is the only substantial difference between the Texas
Lemon Law and lemon laws of other states. See id. at 14.
77. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 3.02-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
("Powers and Duties" of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission); see id. §§ 5.02(8) (makes it
unlawful for any manufacturer, distributor or representative to fail to perform its warranty
obligations after complaint and hearing by Commission); & § 4.07 (requiring dealers to provide notice of complaint procedure to every new car buyer). Mr. Fondren pointed out the
utility of merely extending the authority of the Commission which already handles warranty
complaints, especially since there was already a notice provision required by law. See Hearings
on Tex. S.B. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development, 68th Leg. 2, 4 (side 1)
(April 20, 1983).
78. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The
Commission is authorized to "adopt rules and conduct hearings for the enforcement and implementation of this section" and "Subchapter C" of the Act is applicable (referring to § 3.02.06). See id. § 6.07(e).
79. See id. § 2.03(a). No two dealer/members are allowed to be franchised by the same
manufacturer or distributor. See id. § 2.03(a). The other four non-dealer members shall be
"persons from the public.., who do not have, except as consumers, interests in any business
that manufactures, distributes, or sells new motor vehicles." See id. § 2.03(a); see also id.
§ 2.02 (members appointed by Governor with advice and consent of Senate).
80. Id. § 3.04. The consumer is not forced to go to Austin to be heard because, in the
past, the Commission has gone to the locality of the aggrieved consumer to conduct the hearings. See Hearingson Texas S.B. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development,
68th Leg. 7 (side 2) (April 20, 1983) (statement of Mr. Fondren of TADA). The average
length of time it takes the Commission to render a decision is approximately forty-two days.
See Hearingson Tex. H.B. 2211 Before the House Comm. on Transportation, 68th Leg. (1983)
(statement by Mr. Fondren). This is comparable to the FTC regulations of IDSM's which
require a decision to be made within forty days from the complaint. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(d)
(1984).
81. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (provides
purchaser using provisions of § 6.07 with trial de novo after exhaustion of administrative remedies in action only against manufacturer or distributor; not dealer); see also Administrative
Procedureand Texas Register Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(c) (Vernon
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provision providing a trial de novo for the manufacturer; therefore, evidence
of the Commission's decision is admissible in evidence if the manufacturer
requests judicial review. 82
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK OF CHRYSLER
83

v

TEXAS MOTOR

VEHICLE COMMISSION

One year after the Texas Lemon Law was approved, the Chrysler Corporation filed an action in the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Texas, requesting a declaratory judgment that section 6.07 of the Texas
Motor Vehicle Commission Code violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution. 4 Upon cross motions for summary
judgment, Judge Nowlin declared the Lemon Law unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 8 ' The statute was declared unconstitutional on two separate grounds.8 6 First, the differential treatment afforded
car owners and manufacturers in the review procedure of the Commission's
decision was held to lack a rational basis and therefore deprived manufacturers of due process and equal protection. 7 Second, since the court found
Supp. 1985) (if manner of review authorized is by trial de novo, court "may not admit in
evidence the fact of said agency action or the nature of that action").
82. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 7.01(a)(d) (Vernon 1976) (either
party may appeal within thirty days of Commission's final decision in District Court of Travis
County; issue will be whether Commission's decision is invalid, arbitrary, or unreasonable).
83. No. 83-641 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 1984), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. Chrysler v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, No. 83-641, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Tex. June 12,
1984), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). Chrysler also requested that the Motor Vehicle
Commission be permanently enjoined from enforcing the lemon statute. See id., slip op. at 1.
85. See id., slip op. at 4-5 (judgment based on Memorandum Opinion and Order).
86. See id., slip op. at 1-2. Chrysler's third ground, that the federal Magnuson-Moss Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1979), preempts the state's lemon law by virtue of the supremacy
clause, U. S. CONST. art. VI, was found to be without merit. See id., slip op. at 4. Section
231 l(b)(l) of the Act states that "nothing in this chapter shall invalidate or restrict any right
or remedy of any consumer under any state or under any federal law." See id., slip op. at 4
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1979)).
87. See id., slip op. at 2-3. A purchaser who initiates a proceeding under the Lemon Law
and receives either a favorable or unfavorable decision before the Commission may pursue a de
novo action in court. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp.
1985) (requirement only that purchaser exhaust all administrative remedies before pursuing de
novo action; no requirement he first receive unfavorable decision before the Commission). The
purchaser may therefore disregard a favorable decision and bring a de novo action using the
§ 6.07 presumptions, and in addition, recover possible treble damages and attorney's fees
under the DTPA. See id. § 6.07(e) ("Chapter 17" refers to the Texas DTPA). A manufacturer, however, upon an unfavorable decision, is not only restricted to judicial review of the
Commission's order, but must also comply with the order immediately becuse petition for
judicial review does not automatically stay the order. See Administrative Procedureand Texas
RegisterAct, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (peti-
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dealers to have both a substantial pecuniary and institutional interest in the
adjudication of the manufacturer-purchaser warranty disputes, the fact that
five of the nine Commissioners are required to be dealers was held to deny
manufacturers due process. 88
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, after a
thorough analysis of the Texas Lemon Law procedure, found no violation of
any constitutional right of automobile manufacturers and reversed the district court's finding that the statute was unconstitutional. 9
A.

The Constitutionality of the Texas Lemon Law's Administrative
Review Procedure Which Affords Differential Treatment for
Manufacturersand Purchasers

In upholding the constitutionality of the administrative review procedure,
the Fifth Circuit initially rejected Chrysler's argument that the absence of
automatic supersedeas renders the Commission's order, in practice, unappealable and thus denies manufacturers due process. 9° The court found

tion for review does not affect enforcement of agency decision). Therefore, noncompliance
might subject the manufacturer to the risk of losing its business license under TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 4.06(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (Commission may revoke or suspend outstanding license for failure to comply with Act "or any rule promulgated by Commission"). Fines of up to one thousand dollars per day for noncompliance under § 6.01 may be
levied. See id. § 6.07(e). The court found that the Commission's decision in a § 6.07 action is
"in practice unappealable" for manufacturers and thus denies them due process. Chrysler v.
Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, No. 83-641, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 1984), rev'd, 755
F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). The Commission's contention that there was no serious threat of
license revocation or fines was found immaterial since even the possibility of those sanctions
being imposed "places the manufacturer in a constitutionally untenable situation." See id., slip
op. at 3. The court further held that this unequal burden upon the manufacturer's ability to
obtain judicial review has no rational basis, thus denying manufacturer's due process and equal
protection. See id., slip op. at 2.
88. See id., slip op. at 3-4. The court found dealers to have an institutional interest in
finding for purchasers thereby ensuring that manufacturers carry the burden of warranty
claims. See id., slip op. at 3-4. The pecuniary interest is had when manufacturers bear the
costs of satisfying the customers claims. See id., slip op. at 4.
89. Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (opinion
written by Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge). The court affirmed the district court's
finding that the lemon law is not preempted by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See id. at
1194.
90. See id. 1196-1200 (5th Cir. 1985). Chrysler claims that the absence of an automatic
stay of the Commission's order pending appeal subjects the manufacturer to such a risk of
penalty so as to force compliance of the order. See Brief of Appellee at 11-13, n.15, Chrysler
Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1985). Any appeal would, therefore, become moot since a successful manufacturer thereafter faces a difficult task of recovering
the amount paid to the purchaser. See id. at 11-13. Chrysler argued that this burden placed
on the manufacturer's right to appeal is sufficient in itself to violate their right to due process.
See id. at 11-13.
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Texas' customary use of temporary injunction to restrain enforcement of
agency decisions sufficient to provide supersedeas and, therefore, found no
violation of due process. 9 The court then turned to Chrysler's claim that
the difference in treatment of manufacturers and purchasers for purposes of
appellate review of the Commission's decision violates due process and equal
protection. 92 The court found the appropriate standard for judicial review
of the legislative classification between manufacturers and purchasers was
93
whether the classification is rationally related to a valid state objective.
The mere fact that procedural rights are involved was not found to justify a
higher standard of judicial review which would result in an inappropriate
intrusion into the weighing of economic objectives and values. 94 Since
wealth is not a suspect criterion it could not necessitate the more rigorous
review suggested by Chrysler.9 5
Finally, the court determined that the differential treatment afforded man-

91. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1200 (5th Cir.
1985). The court pointed out that the petition for temporary injunction is the same method of
supersedeas used in review of many Texas agency orders including the Texas Public Utility
Commission, the Texas Board of Insurance, the Texas Railroad Commission, whose orders
have an even greater impact and usually involves a much greater amount of money. See id. at
1200. The court ruled that although Texas could have chosen a "more traditional appellate
scheme," there is no showing that this method of supersedeas has worked a hardship on litigants in the past. See id. at 1200; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of
America at 7, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)
(although a more logical approach would be a statutory provision for supersedeas, fact that
Texas uses temporary injunctions to stay administrative orders, does not render procedure
unconstitutional).
92. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 (5th Cir.
1985). The court conceded that "in the broadest sense of 'appellate review,'" manufacturers
and purchasers are treated differently for purposes of judicial review. See id. at 1201.
93. See id. at 1200-01. The court rejected Chrysler's suggestion of a need for a higher
standard of review because the legislative classification of purchasers and manufacturers affects
matters of procedural rights and also discriminates against a near-suspect class, wealth. See id.
at 1200-01.
94. See id. at 1200-01. In suggesting a heightened standard for judicial review because
procedural matters were involved, Chrysler relied on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In
re Gault, which asserts that courts have "particular responsibility" for procedural due process
and legislatures should expect only a "cautious deference for their procedural judgments". See
Brief of Appellee at 8, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1967)). The court rejected Chrysler's theory since
legislative economic decisions and policy are often, and of necessity, expressed in procedural
terms. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1201-02 (5th Cir.
1985).
95. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1202-03 (5th Cir.
1985). Wealth was rejected as a suspect class in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and the court here also refused to add it to the "suspect list" by
analogizing its relationship to other suspect classes. See id. at 1202-03. The court then found
that deference must be accorded the legislature here as "the Fourteenth Amendment gives the
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ufacturers and purchasers is rationally related to valid state objectives.9 6
The Texas Legislature was entitled to encourage lemon owners to use the
extrajudicial warranty dispute resolution system by providing that it can be
used without prejudice.9 7 The legislature was also entitled to deal with the
limited class of car purchasers who are unevenly matched against the class of
manufacturers who are much better equipped to handle extensive litigation.9 8 The court also noted the marked difference in economic stakes between the two classes of litigants.9 9 Manufacturers have a greater interest in
successfully defending lemon claims in order to protect the reputation of
their product; while on the other hand, car owners are not likely to expend a

greater amount on litigation than the initial price of their car. ° Therefore,

in abiding by the equal protection command that similarly situated persons
be treated similarly in areas of legislative classifications, Texas is correct in
recognizing that automobile purchasers and manufacturers are not similarly
situated in litigating warranty disputes.'° Thus, Texas has valid objectives
in attempting to balance the economic interests of the two classes of litigants

federal courts no power to impose upon the states their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Id. at 1202 (citing Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970)).
96. See id. at 1202.
97. See id.at 1203. By conditioning the availability of the § 6.07 benefits upon submission before the Commission for hearing, Texas is clearly attempting to encourage the purchasers' use of the administrative forum to resolve their warranty disputes. See id. at 1203. Texas
is also entitled to provide that its use is without prejudice, since a purchaser might not otherwise be as likely to submit his claim to the Commission if his claim will later be prejudiced as a
result. See id. at 1203; see also Brief of Appellant at 6-7, Chrysler v. Texas Motor Veh.
Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (Texas has a valid interest in encouraging the use of an
inexperienced, more efficient dispute resolution system which helps relieve the crowded court
dockets).
98. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1202 (5th Cir.
1985). The court notes the reality that as between the manufacturer and purchaser, the party
more likely to suffer hardship and loss of income during the pendancy of litigation will be the
purchaser, who also has his assets tied up in the lemon car. See id. at 1202.
99. See id. at 1202. . This point was very effectively propounded by amicus curiae. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America at 11-13, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas
Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1203 (5th Cir.
1985); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America, Chrysler v. Texas
Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). In addition, amicus curiae cites a very
effective illustration in support of the hypothesis that "plaintiffs are psychologically predisposed to seek settlement and defendants are psychologically predisposed to resist settlement in
favor of trial." See id. (citing G. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 130 (1983) (West
Pub. Co. Text)).
101. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1203 (5th Cir.
1985). The court treated Chrysler's argument that the procedure used must treat parties
equally and without regard to characteristics such as economic status as a "specific application" of the requirement that similarly situated persons be treated similarly and rejected its
application here since manufacturers and purchasers are not similarly situated. See id.
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who are unevenly matched °2 and in encouraging the purchaser's use of the
administrative procedure to resolve his lemon claims before initiating an action in court. o3
B.

The Constitutionality of the Make-Up of the Texas Motor Vehicle
Commission's Majority Dealer Membership

In upholding the constitutionality of the Texas Lemon Law, the Fifth Circuit also rejected Chrysler's claim that the composition of the Commission,
the majority of whom are dealers, denies manufacturers due process in that
dealers have a substantial pecuniary and institutional interest in deciding
against manufacturers. ° 4 The proper test in determining whether an adjudicator of facts is impermissibly biased against a class of litigants, so as to
constitute a denial of due process, is whether the facts present a "possible
temptation to the average man as a judge" towards partiality.10 5 After a
survey of the cases dispositive of this issue,10 6 the court recognized that
102. See id. at 1203. The court notes that Supreme Court cases recognize the state's duty
to "equalize access to the courts by assisting the poor." See id. at 1203. The court also points
out that "much of tort law rests on such economic adjustments and legislative assumptions
about economic incentives and allocative efficiencies." See id. at 1203.
103. See id. at 1203. Therefore, since the legislative classificiations of the lemon law are
rationally related to these valid state objectives, the differential treatment afforded manufacturers and purchasers does not deny manufacturers due process nor equal protection. See id. at
1203.
104. See id. at 1197-99. Chrysler argued that by finding for the purchasers in the manufacturer-purchaser warranty disputes, the dealers are benefitted in many ways. See Brief of
Appellee at 16-28, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.
1985). By satisfying the purchaser's warranty claim, which might have otherwise been directed at the dealer, they effectively draw the "legal fire away from themselves" and, furthermore, by setting a precedent of successful purchaser recovery under § 6.07, they encourage
future lemon claimants to seek their remedies against the manufacturer under this provision
and not against the dealers under traditional remedies. See id. at 22. The district court found
this interest to be the "institutional interest" which dealers had in deciding in favor of car
buyers. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, No. 83-641, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D.
Tex. June 12, 1984), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). The "pecuniary interest" was found
to be the dealer's benefit of customer satisfaction and goodwill at the expense of the manufacturer. See id., slip op. at 4. Finally, Chrysler argued that dealers have a substantial interest in
finding the car to be defective rather than, in the alternative, admitting that the problem lies
with their own mechanics who cannot perform effective repairs. See Brief of Appellee at 24,
Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
105. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1198 (5th Cir.
1985). Therefore, the fairness of the procedure is not measured by whether the "man of highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice" would be tempted toward partiality. See id. at 1198.
This test is derived from the landmark case of Tumey v. Ohio which found a denial of due
process when a litigant is subjected to the "judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." See
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926).
106. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1198-99 (5th Cir.
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while the economic interest or related bias in question need not be direct, the
immediacy of the interest is measurable on a "continuum of interests" ranging from a judge who is paid only upon convictions, to the most disinterested
impartial justice, and thus, a line must be drawn for "cases at the
and wholly
07
, 1

edge."

Here, Chrysler claimed that the dealer members of the Commission are
substantially benefitted in finding for purchasers in their lemon claims
against manufacturers in that: (1) manufacturers are made to sustain the
burden of warranty claims which would otherwise be directed at the dealers
under traditional remedies, (2) dealers gain the benefit of customer satisfaction at the manufacturer's expense, and finally (3) manufacturers carry the
blame for car problems as being the result of defective design rather than
blame being attached to the dealer's ineffective repairs. 10 The court, however, found the "predictors of bias" to "point in opposite directions" since
speculations can be equally made in favor of the dealers' partiality toward
manufacturers. 0 9 Given the competitive relationship that exists between
dealers, one dealer might be naturally predisposed to find that the fault lies
with another competitive dealer. o Also, the dealers stand to lose each time
a car of the same make which they sell is branded a lemon. 11 In response to
Chrysler's claim that dealers effectively divert warranty claims from themselves by finding for purchasers, the court pointed out that while dealers are
1985). In Tumey v. Ohio, a village ordinance which provided that the judge of liquor violations was only to be paid in cases which resulted in conviction was struck as a denial of due
process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926). Ruling that the interest in question
need not be direct, the Court in Ward v. Village of Monroeville found a violation of due process
where the village derived a large part of its revenues from fines and costs imposed by the
mayor's court. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). However, where a
city was not governed solely by a mayor but also by five commissioners and a city manager
who exercised all executive functions, the Court found the relationship between the city's revenues and the mayor's court too remote. See Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 64 (1928). Once
again an indirect financial interest was found to result in a violation of due process in Gibson v.
Berryhill, where a state board of optometry composed only of private practitioners adjudicated
complaints directed at corporate employed optometrists, the elimination of whom would effectively wipe out more than half of the private practitioner's competition. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
107. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir.
1985). The immediacy of the economic interest cannot be measured in definite, objective terms
but rather must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1198.
108. See id. at 1198.
109. See id. at 1199.
110. See id. at 1199.
111. See id.at 1199. Another equally plausible speculation advanced by the state is that
dealers would favor their own manufacturer with whom they have an ongoing relationship and
who is essential to their continued existence as dealers. See Brief of Appellant at 9, Chrysler
Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (arguing that the bias
perceived by Chrysler rests on a "dubious chain of inferences").
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allowed to disclaim warranties made by manufacturer to purchaser, they
may still be sued for negligent repair regardless of the outcome of the claim
against the manufacturer." 12 Since mere inferences of bias both ways tend to
contradict the claim that partiality exists, the court found speculations
which "tumble against each other" do not support a finding of bias sufficient
to constitute a denial of due process. 113

VI.

THE TEXAS LEMON LAW CONFORMS WITH THE UNDERLYING
GOAL OF WARRANTY REGULATION IN THAT IT EQUALIZES
THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN TWO PARTIES WHO
ARE NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED

The very essence of warranty regulation laws is to "redress the ill effects
resulting from the imbalance which presently exists in the relative bargaining power of consumers and suppliers of consumer products." ' 4 This is the
goal of the Texas Lemon Law." 5 The legislature sought to equalize the
relative positions of the purchaser and the manufacturer by providing both a
definitive cause of action and also an inexpensive and effective dispute resolution system." 6 The constitutional attack of Chrysler v. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission stems from the uniqueness of the Texas Lemon Law's
dispute resolution system in that manufacturers and purchasers are treated
differently.'
However, to provide for an effective dispute resolution system, purchasers must necessarily be treated more favorably than manufacturers in order to equalize the disparity between the two parties.'1 8 It is this
112. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.
1985) (negating claim that dealers are able to find for purchasers and thus absolve themselves
of all liability).
113. See id. at 1195. Not only was the possibility of temptation found without merit, the
court also found significance in the fact that four of the nine commissioners are not dealers, but
consumers, and decisions are made by the whole commission and not only by a few members.
See id. at 1195.
114. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON MAGNUSON-MOSs WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT, S. Rep. No. 93-151, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2

(1973).
115. See Hearingson Tex. SB. 1411 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Development,
68th Leg. 4 (April 20, 1983) (purpose of lemon law to redress grievances of lemon owners who
have suffered at hands of indifferent manufacturers).
116. See id. at4, 14.
117. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (5th
Cir. 1985).
118. See Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace. The Needfor
Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357, 400-10 (1972) (consumer at disadvantage when faced with manufacturer's more informed representative; even most articulate
layman has difficulty in determining what is relevant and presenting it in persuasive manner);
Leff, Injury Ignoranceand Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 20-22
(1970) (warrantor acts rationally by delaying resolution of warranty disputes since it becomes
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underlying element that the Fifth Circuit recognized when it reinstated the
Texas Lemon Law." l 9

The virtue of Texas' unique procedure for dispute resolution is clearly
illustrated when compared with the IDSMs provided for by other states'
lemon laws and the problems inherent in those mechanisms. First of all,
while the requirements for these dispute settlement mechanisms are designed
to minimize the bias of panel members,' 2 ° the extent of impartiality that can
exist when the members owe their employment on the arbitration board to
the manufacturer has been seriously questioned. 1 2' The evidence presently
available, "suggests that the make-up of arbitration panels works against
consumers."' 22 The federal requirement of no direct manufacturer involvement through the panel members does not necessarily mean that there is no
bias in favor of the manufacturer/employer.1 23 Presumably, the dissatisfied
consumer should be consoled by the fact that since the decision is not bind-

too costly for many consumers to pursue their remedy); cf Note, Consumer Product Warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 738, 740 (1977) (stricter obligations need to be imposed on party with greater bargaining power to compensate for consumer's ignorance).
119. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1202 (5th Cir.

1985) (Texas entitled to deal with "reality that the manufacturer with its resources for litigation" enjoy significant advantage over consumer who is only able to pursue his claim "as long
as his purse and his patience endure").
120. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.3(b) (1984) (warrantor/sponsor must take steps necessary to
insure mechanism members not influenced by warrantor including "committing funds in advance, basing personnel decisions solely on merit, and not assigning conflicting warrantor or
sponsor duties to mechanism staff persons").
121. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 309 & n.80 (1983) (panel members can be fined by
manufacturer if members "too aggressive"; FTC regulations that panel members not be biased
impossible to enforce unless in cases of clear abuse); Note, Incentivesfor WarrantorFormation
of Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 239 n.33 (1978) (suggests
steps to make dispute settlement mechanisms free from bias on part of panel members).
122. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 309 n.79 (1983); see also Note, A Sour Note: A Look

at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L. REV. 846, 874 n.146 (1984) (citing Car Owner's
Gripes Getting Industry Ear, MPLS. STAR. & TRIB. at B4, col. 1 (July 4, 1983)). Of the cases
decided by Ford's five year pilot dispute settlement mechanism program, sixty-three percent
favored the manufacturer or dealer. See id. at 874 n.146.
123. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 309 (1983). Since the Texas Lemon Law provides
for hearing before a state agency, and a neutral arbitrator, the danger of partiality towards the
employer/manufacturer does not exist as it does when a manufacturer-sponsored arbitration
mechanism is used. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp.

1985). Similarly, the Vermont Lemon Law provides for a state-run arbitration board to conduct hearings if the consumer elects this alternative instead of the manufacturer's mechanism.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4174(a) (Supp. 1985). See generally Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be
Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 309
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ing, he may subsequently resort to traditional litigation.124 Although the
decision is nonbinding, it is admissible as evidence in any subsequent suit
arising out of the same warranty obligation. 12 5 Consumers, therefore, who
are dissatisfied with the decision rendered by a possibly biased arbitration
panel, face "uphill and 12more
expensive battles in persuading the court that
6
they have good cases."
Furthermore, even if the consumer does receive a satisfactory decision
from the arbitration mechanism, the manufacturer is only bound to exercise
"good faith" in deciding whether to abide by the mechanism's decisions. 127
The arbitration provision, therefore, becomes counter-productive in that it
operates to unnecessarily delay the consumer's ultimate relief under the
lemon laws. 128 The manufacturer, who has nothing to gain by an expeditious settlement, is at a considerable advantage over the consumer whose
money is invested in the lemon and who is without transportation during the
entire process. 12 1 It is not surprising that consumer dispute settlement
mechanisms like these, which do not possess effective sanctions against the

(1983) (advocates arbitration members be made "accountable to the public and not to the
manufacturer" in order to prevent bias towards manufacturer).
Although in Chrysler Corp. v.Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, the make-up of the Commission's
membership was upheld as constitutional, this author advocates extending application of the
recusal provision of § 3.040) to § 6.07 which would disqualify dealers from participating in
disputes wherein their own manufacturer or distributor was involved. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 3.040) (Vernon Supp. 1985). This is asserted in light of the substantial interest a dealer would have in deciding in favor of his manufacturer with whom he
has an ongoing relationship and who is essential to his continued existence as a dealers. See
Brief of Appellant at 9, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.
1985).
124. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) (1984) (mechanism's decisions not binding on any party;
therefore, consumer may pursue traditional litigation).
125. See id. § 703.5(g)(2) (mechanism's decision admissible in evidence). But see Smith v.
Universal Services, 454 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1972) (although decision reached by dispute
settlement mechanism admissible, Act fails to specify weight it should be accorded); see also
Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and Comparison with UC.C Coverage,
Disclaimers and Remedies in Consumer Warranties, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1111, 1139 (1976)
(admission of mechanism's decisions will encourage parties to dispute partiality of result
reached as well as to litigate merits).
126. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate

Remedies, 17

CLEARINGHOUSE REV.

302, 309 (1983).

127. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) (1984). But see CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(e) (West 1984)
(makes mechanism's decision binding on warrantor but not on consumer).
128. See Note, A Sour Note: A Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L. REV.
846, 875 (1984) (mandatory requirement of submission before a dispute settlement mechanism
restricts consumers rights by barring them from pursuing immediate relief).
129. See Note, Incentivesfor WarrantorFormationof Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 52 S.CAL. L. REV. 235, 236 (1978) (warrantors stand to gain considerably by prolonging litigation in hopes consumers, who cannot afford extensive litigation, will drop out).
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'1 30
manufacturers, are regarded by consumers as mere "window dressing.
The Texas Lemon Law, however, successfully avoids these problems by providing for an independent state agency to resolve disputes, by making the
Commission's decision binding on the manufacturer so that the arbitration
proceeding does not result in a "useless thing," and by providing the purchaser with a de novo action so as to encourage use of the resolution

system. 131
Since warranty dispute resolution systems benefit not only the purchaser
but also the manufacturer, the Texas Lemon Law serves another purpose in
encouraging the purchaser's use of the extrajudicial proceeding by providing
that its use is without prejudice. 32 By conditioning the beneficial provisions
of the Texas Lemon Law upon mandatory submission to the administrative
hearing, the manufacturer is given a chance to attempt a compromise with
the purchaser. 33 The purchaser who receives an unfavorable decision from

the Commission might accept a lower settlement from the manufacturer instead of pursuing a court action which would entail further delay and expense in the hopes of recovering a slightly larger settlement.1 34 Therefore,

130. See Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need
for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357, 381 (1982) (lack of effective
sanctions against manufacturer reason why consumers regard such dispute settlement mechanism as useless).
131. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
132. See id. § 6.07(e) (provides purchaser with de novo action); see also Brief of Appellant
at 6-7, Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (state also
serves its own interests by encouraging purchaser's use of extrajudicial dispute resolution system in that its use relieves crowded court dockets).
133. See Debate on Tex. H.B. 2211 on the Floor of the House, 68th Leg. (May 17, 1983).
This is implicit in the fact that Rep. Price's amendment which would have made submission
before the Commission optional and not a mandatory prerequisite to an action under the
lemon law, was rejected. See id. See generally Note, Sweetening the Fate of the "Lemon"
Owner: California and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 ToLEDO L. REV. 341, 364-65 (1983) (automotive industry removed its opposition to California
lemon bill when provision requiring submission to dispute resolution mechanism was
included).
134. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (includes
no provision for recovery of collateral charges, attorney's fees and treble damages that car
owner could possibly otherwise recover in a successful court action under TDTPA); see also
Debate on Tex. H.B. 2211 on the Floor of the House, 68th Leg. (May 17, 1983) (proposed
amendment to include mandatory recovery of collateral charges was rejected in order to allow
Commission discretion in deciding what amount should be recovered). The Fifth Circuit in
Chrysler recognized the warranty dispute resolution forum as a "limited claim route where a
manufacturer faces much less exposure and a successful purchaser's claims will likely end."
See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1202 (5th Cir. 1985). See
generally Note, Sweetening the Fate of the Lemon Owner: California and Connecticut Pass
Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 341, 373 (1983) (predicts
that "most lemon cases brought to arbitration will be settled without complete replacement or
refund by the manufacturer").
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since the purchaser's use of the administrative procedure is also to the manufacturer's substantial advantage, its use should not be discouraged by attaching prejudice to the resulting decision.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, lemon owners have had many obstacles to overcome in order to recover. The consumer's burden of abrogating the manufacturer's
limited remedy of repair or replacement of defective parts before entitlement
to any other remedy is just one obstacle among many. As a result, lemon
laws were enacted to redress the grievances of defective car owners.
Although the Texas Lemon Law is in substance much like those in other
states, its mechanism for effective dispute resolution is distinct. In essence,
the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission is an effective alternative to the heavily criticized informal dispute settlement mechanisms sponsored by manufacturers. First, there is no risk of a panel member's partiality toward an
employer/manufacturer. Also, the Commission possesses effective sanctions
against the manufacturer so that submission to the arbitration procedure will
not be regarded by the consumers as a "useless thing" established only for
the purpose of delay. Even though its use is mandatory before the consumer
may use the beneficial provisions of section 6.07, the purchaser is not discouraged from using the arbitration procedure since his right to a de novo
action is preserved in the event of dissatisfaction. Finally, the Commission
does not force the consumer to travel long distances just to present his case
in person.
The preservation of the purchaser's de novo cause of action is rationally
related to the state's valid interest of encouraging purchasers to submit to
the dispute resolution system, provided by the Commission, which enures to
the benefit of all involved: state, purchaser, and manufacturer. Fortunately,
for Texas lemon owners, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the differential
treatment afforded manufacturers and purchasers under the Texas Lemon
Law conforms with the purpose of warranty regulation in general by equalizing the disparity between two parties who are not similarly situated, and
therefore, does not deny manufacturers due process or equal protection.
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